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Abstract 
In this paper, we first consider a Bayesian frame­
work and model the "utility function" in terms 
of fuzzy random variables. On the basis of this 
model, we define the "prior (fuzzy) expected util­
ity" associated with each action, and the cor­
responding "posterior (fuzzy) expected utility 
given sample information from a random exper­
iment". The aim of this paper is to analyze how 
sample information can affect the expected util­
ity. In this way, by using some fuzzy preference 
relations, we conclude that sample information 
allows a decision maker to increase the expected 
utility on the average. The upper bound on the 
value of the expected utility is when the decision 
maker has perfect information. Applications of 
this work to the field of artificial intelligence are 
presented through two examples. 
Keywords: fuzzy preference relation; fuzzy 
utility function; perfect information; sample in­
formation. 
1 Introduction 
In traditional decision-making problems, proba­
bilities are numerical representations of the be­
liefs and the current state of information of the 
decision maker, whereas utilities are regarded 
as numerical representations of his preferences. 
Thus, in these problems the decision maker must 
•visiting from the Department of Mathematics, Uni­
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be able to quantify the relative value of any sit­
uation. that may arise. 
In a Bayesian context, the utility function is 
formalized as follows ( cf., [4 ]). Let 0 and A de­
note the state and action spaces of the Decision 
problem, and let { be the prior distribution on 
a measurable space defined on 0. Then, a util­
ity function is a real-valued function u on 0 X A 
such that 
• for each action a E A, u(.,a) is a random 
variable on the measurable space defined on 
e, having a finite expectation with respect 
to x denoted by E[u(alx)]. 
• a is preferred or indifferent to a' (depending 
on decision maker's preferences) if and only 
if E[u(aix)] � E[u(a'lx)]. 
The utility assessment procedures usually in­
volve the acceptance of some conditions or ax­
ioms for the preference relations, in order to 
guarantee the existence of a numerical utility 
function (axiomatic approach to the Utility The­
ory ) . As remarked in previous papers (see, for in­
stance, [1], [6], [8], [11], [12], [14], (17], [19], [20], 
and [21], the necessity for assessing utilities in 
terms of numerical values may be, in. practice, 
too restrictive, whereas the use of fuzzy sets to 
describe utilities is often more realistic. Fol ow­
ing the ideas of traditional decision analysis, we 
are going to formalize the notion of fuzzy utility 
function by using the concepts of fuzzy random 
variable and the associated expected value, as 
defined in [15]. On the basis of this notion, we 
will then establish a principle of choice among ac­
tions, in which the optimum action is that which 
provides the decision maker with the (prior or 
posterior) "highest expected utility". Since the 
expected utility is in this case a fuzzy number, 
its highest value will be determined by consid­
ering a suitable fuzzy preference relation based 
on a ranking of fuzzy numbers satisfying some 
desirable properties. The main contribution of 
this paper is the analysis of the averoge worth of 
sample information (from a random experiment 
whose distribution depends on the state in 0) 
and worth of perfect information about the state 
in e (which is seldom available in practice), for 
the decision maker. This enables the decision 
maker to conclude whether or not to perform the 
experiment. T his comparison will also be devel­
oped through the same preference relation, and 
the analysis will be completed with an illustra­
tive example, in which a particular fuzzy prefer­
ence relation introduced by Kolodziejczyk [12] is 
considered. 
The issue of worth of sample information is 
ubiquitous in the field of artificial intelligence. 
To motivate the usefulness of these concepts 
to any decision analysis problem we will now 
present two examples, one in the field of image 
processing and the other in medical diagnosis. 
F irst let us consider a quality control vision 
system which separates acceptable components 
from those with defects. For the sake of simplic­
ity let us assume that the state space consists of 
two states- "acceptable" and "defective" compo­
nents. T he prior probability distribution on the 
states is available and the action space consists 
of two states - "accept" and "reject". Suppose 
the manufacturing cost of the component being 
inspected is x units and the cost associated with 
the time required (t) to inspect a component is 
CT(t ). If a. good component is rejected, then 
the loss is x units + "cost associated with late 
delivery" + CT(t). On the other hand, if a bad 
component is accepted and delivered to the cus­
tomer, then the cost is equal to replacement cost 
(= x units)+ "loss of reputation"+ CT(t). The 
imprecise utilities (intended as the opposite of 
losses) for these two cases are clearly fuzzy be-
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Figure 1: Membership functions of the Fuzzy 
Utilities "dangerous" and "inconvenient" 
cause of the second term in the loss function. 
In a typical quality control vision system there 
is an abundance of information, such as the gray 
level of each pixel of the image. Processing of 
all the information is usually very expensive and 
time consuming, therefore one may wish to de­
sign several procedures, Pt, ... , Pn, such that 
procedure P1 is the least accurate (w.r.t. prob­
ability of correct prediction) and procedure I{ 
takes input from J{_l and predicts more accu­
rately than Pi-t· Thus, if an accurate result 
is desired, then several procedures must be exe­
cuted in sequence which is time consuming. The 
objective of this system is to maximize the utility 
(or minimize the loss) and since the time to in­
spect is also a parameter in the utility function, 
the worth of sample information may be used to 
determine when the information available is suf­
fucient to make a "good" decision. That is, the 
worth of samnple information may be used as a 
stopping criterion for the vision algorithm. 
On the other hand, in decision-making liter­
ature we can often find examples involving sta­
tistical decision problems in whlch utilities are 
quantified in terms of exact values but it would 
be more natural to quantify them in terms of 
fuzzy values. The following example have been 
taken from (22], an introductory text of statis­
tics: suppose a neurologist has to classify his 
most serious patients as requiring exploratory 
brain surgery (action a1) or not (action a2 ). 
From past autopsies, it ha.s been found that 60% 
of the examined people needed the operation 
while 40% did not. The utilities (intended as th� 
opposite of losses) of right classifications are null. 
The utilities of a. wrong classification are obvi­
ous: an unnecessary operation means resources 
are wasted and the patient may be hurt. The 
other utility may be worse: if a patient requiring 
surgery does not get it, the time lost until clear 
symptoms appear may be crucial. In Wonnacott 
and Wonnacott [22], the preceding problem is 
regarded as a. decision problem with state space 
0 = {Ot,8 2}(!11 = the patient requires surgery, 
(J? = the patient does not require surgery), a.c­
twn space A = {a1,a2}, and utility function 
u�8
h
t,at) = u(02,a2) = 0, u(8 t,a2) = 5u(02,at), 
w1t u(02, a1) < 0. However, the preceding as­
sessment of utilities seems to be extremely pre­
cise, due to the nature of the actions and states 
in the problem. Thus, the following assessment 
could express better the decision maker (neurol­
ogist) "preferences": U(01,at) = U(02,a2) = 0, 
U(02,at) = "inconvenient", U(01,a2) = "dan­
gerous", where U(fh,a2) and U(02,at) are de­
scribed by means of the fuzzy sets characterized 
by the membership functions in F igure 1. The 
interest for incorporating sample information in 
this ca.se is obvious: if the neurologist has to clas­
sify a serious patient a.s requiring or not requiring 
brain surgery, then he could either base his de­
cision on the prior information or as is common 
in practice, try to get information regarding that 
patient before making a decision . 
2 Preliminary Concepts 
The following notation will be used throughout 
the paper. (0, C,O is a probability space associ­
ated with the state space 0, A= { a1, . . . , aN} is 
the set of all possible actions, and Fo(�) denote 
the collection of all fuzzy subsets V of � . charac­
terized by a membership function flv : R -+ [0, 1] 
satisfying the following properties: 
(1) supp V =closure of {wE� il-lv(w) � 0} 
is compact (i.e., dosed and bounded). 
(2) La(V) = a-level set of V = {w E � I 
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11v(w) �a} is closed for each 0 �a� 1. 
(3) L t(V) = modal set of V = {w E :R 1 
JLv(w) = 1} -:f0, 
Definition 2.1 A (one-dimensional) fuzzy 
random variable (FRV) is a function V : e -+ 
Fo(:R), such that { (8, w) I w E La(V(8))} E 
C x B�, where B� is the Borel a-field on R. 
(In other words, the random set La(V(. )}, de­
fined on 8, is measurable for each 0 � a� 1). 
FRY s generalize both, random variables and 
random sets. 
Definition 2.2 Let V : 0 -+ Fo(�) be 
� (simple) FRV taking on the (fuzzy) values 
vl' ... 'vk E Fo(:R) on Ct I • • .  I ck E c, respec­
tively (where Uj=1 Cj = 8, and Ci U Cj = 0 for 
i :f j}. Then, the expected value of V with 
respect to the J?.robability measure� on (8, C) is 
the fuzzy set E(V I�) = fe V(8) lf<((J) E Fo(�) 
given by 
k 
E(VI�) = E fj �(Cj) (1) 
j=l 
For a more general FRV, the definition of its 
expected value can be found in [15]. However, 
in practice simple FRV are usually sufficient to 
model imprecise utilities. 
Remark 2.1 In the original paper of Puri and 
Ralescu (15], the expected value of a FRV is in­
troduced in a different manner - as a generaliza­
tion of the Aumann integral of a random set [2]. 
Even though their final definition more complex 
it is equivalent to Definition 2.2. Thus, E(VI{) is 
defin
_
ed as the unique fuzzy set with the property 
La(E(V!�)) = Aumann integral of the random 
set La(V(.)), for all 0 � a� 1. 
F inally, to extend the notion of utility func­
tion to fuzzy utility function we need to consider 
a third element: comparison of expected values. 
Since the expected values are fuzzy numbers, the 
comparison operation reduces to ranking of fuzzy 
numbers. Several procedures for ranking have 
been proposed in the literature of fuzzy num­
bers. Some of them were introduced so that the 
calculations in the set of fuzzy numbers, with re­
spect to the fuzzy addition and product by a pos­
itive real number, could be performed in a man­
ner analogous to the operations on real numbers 
(and, consequently, the calculations through the 
expected value for a FRV could be performed 
in an analogous way as for random variables) . 
More precisely, we can consider any suitable 
ranking of fuzzy numbers (generically denoted 
by t) such that if [J, V, W, and T are four fuzzy 
numbers such that [J t V and W t T, then 
U + W t V + T (where + = fuzzy addition) , 
and >. .U t >..V { where ,\. means the product by 
a positive scalar..\ ) . On the other hand, t must 
also satisfy [J + ( -U) t 6 and 6 !::: U + ( -U) 
(where iJ is the especial number assigning mem­
bership function equal to 1 to the value 0 and 
equal to 0 otherwise, and ( -U) is the opposite 
to U). Since the purpose of this paper is not to 
discuss the best method for ranking fuzzy num­
bers, we will choose a ranking method from [12] 
which satisfies the preceding properties (Defini­
tion 2.3). The choice is only for the sake of per­
forming computations in the illustrative example 
in Section 6, and is not a basic requirement for 
any of the subsequent analysis. 
Let V E Fo(:R) be a fuzzy number, � V and � 
V denote the fuzzy sets of :R, "more than or equal 
to V" and "less than or equal to V", respectively, 
that is 
{ f.l- (w) if w � z J.t>v(w) = v - 1 if w > z 
{ f.l- (w) if w � z fl<v(w) = v - 1 if w < z 
Definition 2.3 Let [J, V E F0(�) be two fuzzy 
numbers. The coefficient 
R(U V) = dl + d2 + d3 ' d4 + ds + 2d3 (2) 
(d1 = d(�u V �v,�u),d2 = d(�u V � v, 
� U),d3 = d(U n v,o), d4 = d(� u,� V), 
d5 = d(� [J, � V), where d = Hamming dis­
tance between fuzzy sets, V = extended maxi­
mum of fuzzy sets, and n = intersection of fuzzy 
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Figure 2: Areas in the second expression for 
Kolodiejczyk coefficient in Eq. (2) 
sets) represents the degree of truth for the 
assertion "U is not higher than V" and 
(1) U is said to be preferred or indiffer­
ent to V, denoted (J t V, whenever R( U, V) � 
R(V,U) = 1- R(U,V) (that is, whenever 
R(U, V) � .5). 
{2) [J is said to be indifferent to V, denoted 
(J '::! V, whenever R(U,V) = R(V,U) (that is, 
whenever R(U, V) = .5). 
The preceding coefficient R could be alterna­
tively expressed as follows: 
where sl = areas where v "dominates" [!' s2 = 
areas where U "dominates" V, 53 =areas where 
[J and V are "indifferent", 54 = areas where the 
greatest value of (J is lower than the smallest 
value of Vat the same level of membership, and 
55 =areas where the greatest value of V is lower 
than the smallest value of U at the same level of 
membership. Figure 2 explains the meaning of 
the areas considered in the alternative expres­
sion, and illustrates the application of coefficient 
R. Here R(U, V) = .9, and hence V is preferred 
to U. Several examples illustrating the behav­
ior of R and an analysis of its properties may be 
found in [12]. 
3 Modeling the Fuzzy Utility 
Function· 
Definition 3.1 A fuzzy utility function is a 
fuzzy set-valued function U on 0 X A such that 
i) for each action a E A, U(., a) is a FRV on 
(9, C), integmble bounded, and whose expected 
value with respect to � is a fuzzy number denoted 
by E[U(ai�)]. 
ii) a is preferred or indifferent to a' (according 
to the decision maker preferences) if and only if 
E[U(a!OJ t E[U(a'!�)J. 
The assessment of fuzzy utilities has been dis­
cussed in previous studies (see, for instance, [6]). 
Remark 3.1 Conditions (1), (2) and (3) in 
the definition of a FRV and the assumption that 
the fuzzy utility function is integrable bounded 
(see [15]) have been imposed to guarantee that 
the expected value (expected utility) exists and 
is a fuzzy number (intended as a normalized con­
vex fuzzy set). 
Remark 3.2 Definition 3.1 is very similar to 
other definitions previously considered (see, for 
instance [8]), but the present one is slightly more 
general (since it does not require the utility value 
to be fuzzy numbers) and is introduced by fol­
lowing the ideas in the traditional case. 
The next result indicates that if a fuzzy utility 
function exists, then certain linear transforma­
tions of this function will also be utility func­
tions. This property is analogous to a well­
known result in the non-fuzzy case. Thus, 
Theorem 3.1 Let U be a fuzzy utility function 
on 0 X A. Then, the fuzzy set-valued function on 
eX A defined by V(O , a) =a U(O,a) + f3 (where 
a > 0 and f3 are real constants) is also a fuzzy 
utility function. 
Proof: Indeed, V(.,a) = a  U(.,a) + f3 is a FRV 
for each action a E A. Due to the properties of 
the rankings of fuzzy numbers we have consid­
ered, conditions i) and ii) in Definition 3.1 are 
both satisfied. 6 
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The preceding result will allow us to arbitrar­
ily constrain supp U(fJ, a) to be contained in a 
particular real interval (say [0,1]), without loss 
of generality. 
4 Modeling the Principle of 
Choice Without and With 
Experimentation 
For any action a E A, the fuzzy number 
E[U( a!�)] will be called the prior expected utility 
of a. In accordance with condition ii) in Defini­
tion 3.1, the existence of a fuzzy utility function 
entails the acceptance of the decision-making cri­
terion based on the "maximization" of expected 
utility. The Bayes principle of choice may now 
be extended as follows: 
Definition 4.1 An action a* E A is called op­
timal prior action if E[U(a*i�)J � E[U(ai!{)], 
i = 1, . . . ,N. 
Generally, to increase the "highest" expected 
utility in a decision problem the decision maker 
takes advantage of the fact that additional in­
formation may reduce his uncertainty about the 
state in e. In the extreme case, if he were able 
to get "perfect" information about this state, the 
problem of decision-making under uncertainty 
would become a problem of decision-making un­
der certainty. Thus, if the decision maker knows 
for certain that the state of nature is () = ()', then 
the optimal action is the action a( 8') E A such 
that U(fJ',a(fJ')) � U(fJ' , a;), i = 1, . . .  ,N. Nev­
ertheless, perfect information is seldom available, 
and the decision maker must try to get informa­
tion by performing a random experiment whose 
distribution depends on the state in e. 
Let X be a random experiment, characterized 
by a probability space (X, Bx, Po), fJ E e, where 
X is a set in a Euclidean space (in most cases R), 
Bx is the smallest Borel u-field on X and P9 
is a probability measure on (X, Bx ), so that fJ 
is the state governing the experimental distribu­
tion. If the information obtained by performing 
experiment X is x E X, then using Bayes' the­
orem the dedsion maker can use it to revise the 
distribution on 8 in light of the experimental in­
formation. This revision leads to the posterior 
distribution (x on (0, C), and the fuzzy number 
E[U( a\€x )l will be called the posterior expected 
tltility of the action a. The application of the 
decision-making criterion in Definition 4.1 allows 
us now to define the following: 
Definition 4.2 An action a; E A, is called 
optimal posterior action given x, if 
E[U(a;/€x)]!::: E[U(ad�x)J,i = 1, .. . ,N. 
We are now going to formalize an intuitive 
fact: the use of sample information entails a 
"gain" in expected utility on the average. Ob­
viously, this gain will be bounded above by the 
"gain" in expected uti lity due to the use of per­
fect information. 
5 Influences of Perfect and 
Sample Information on Ex­
pected Utility 
Using the criterion in Definition 4.1, the "high­
est" expected utility for the decision maker, un­
der prior information , is equal to E[U(a"'/OJ. If 
perfect information is available , and a(O') E A 
is optimal under perfect information 0 = 8', 
then the utility is given by U(O',a(O')). Con­
sequently, the value of this information when 
We are now going to compare the three situa­
tions above in terms of the considered preference 
relations. 
Theorem 5.1 Regardless of the prior distribu­
tion on{, EVPI � EVSI(X) � 0, whatever 
the random experiment X may be. 
Proof: Indeed, for all x E X, we have 
fe U(O',a(8'))d€x(6') � E(U(a�\�x)] � 
E[U(a'"!�x)] 
By virtue of the properties of t with respect 
to addition of fuzzy numbers and product by a 
positive constant, we conclude that 
f
x 
fa U(O',a(O')) d�x(9') dP(x)!:: 
fx E[U(a; !�x)] dP(x)!:: 
fx E[U(a*l�x)] dP(x) = E[U(a*l�)] 
Remark 5.1 When the selection of a; is possi­
ble for all x E X, fuzzy operations [5,7] guarantee 
that the EVSI could be alternatively computed 
as follows: 
N 
EVSI(X) = L E[U(ai\€x(a;))]P(X(ai)) 
E[U(a*l€)] 
where X(ai) = {x E X!a; = ai} E Bx. In this 
alternative computation scheme, EVSI(X) can 
be regarded as the expected value of a simple 
FRV. 
() = 8' could be measured by means of the 
fuzzy substraction U(O',a(O'))- UW,a"'), and 
hence the Expected Value of Perfect Information 
would be equal to the fuzzy number EV PI = 
f8U(9',a(9')) d€(0')- E[U(a*/�)] . If the deci­
sion maker obtains sample information x by per­
forming X:::::: (X,Bx,Pe),O E 0, the "highest" 6 
expected utility would be equal to E[U(a;/�x)]. 
Thus, the Expected Value of Sample Information 
from X, could be measured by the fuzzy number 
Illustrative example 
We will now examine the neurologist example 
from the introduction section to illustrate re­
sults in Theorem 5.1. If the neurologist has 
to classify a serious patient with no information 
other than the prior information, then he can ob­
tain that E[U(at lx)] = .4U(02,al),E[U(a2!e)] = 
EVSI(X) = fx E[U(a;/�x)] dP(x)- E[U(a*!€)] 
(where P( x) is the marginal probability measure 
on (X,Bx ), obtained from P6(x) and �(0) by ap­
plying the generalized Total Probability Rule). 
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.6U(fh,a2), so that R(E[U(atiE)],E[U(a2IE)]) = 
0, and hence a1 is preferred to a2• Thus, 
E[U(a*l{)] = E[U(atl{)]. 
Suppose that the neurologist tries to make his 
decision on the basis of the information supplied 
by a combined score X obtained from several 
tests. Past experiences have shown that X is 
normally distributed with variance equal to 64 
and mean equal to 120 for those who require 
surgery and 100 for those who do not. On the 
basis of the information from X we can revise 
the prior distribution on 0 to obtain the poste­
rior ones. Then, by computing E[U(aiEx)] for 
each a E A and x E X = �. we conclude 
that it may be possible to determine a; in a 
generic way for each x E X. In this example 
a; = a1 for x � 110 - 3.2 log 6.5, a; = az other­
wise. Consequently, EV PI = -.4 U ( 82, a1 ), and 
EVSI(X) = .1234 U(82,at) + .0136 U(81, a2)­
.4 U(82,a1), whence R(EVSI(X), EVPI) = 
0, and R(EV SI(X), 0) = .2973, that is, the 
EV SI(X) is not higher than the EV PI and 
EV SI(X) is non-negative with a high degree of 
truth (.7027). 
7 Concluding Remarks 
The study in this paper can be immediately 
extended to the case in which the prior dis­
tribution on the state space is fuzzy. In or­
der to express the prior available information 
(non-sample information) in probabilistic terms, 
most (although not all) Bayesians follow, if nec­
essary, the subjective interpretation of proba­
bilities. The description of these probabilities 
by means of imprecise propositions (such as, 
"likely", "improbable", "very likely", and so on), 
is often more realistic than the numerical one. 
The decision-making problem with fuzzy proba­
bilities and fuzzy utilities, has been examined in 
previous papers (see, for instance, [8], [61). We 
now propose to develop a study similar to the 
present one by modeling fuzzy utilities through 
FRV, and using the arithmetic operations on 
fuzzy probabilities in [10]. Another immediate 
extension would be one in which it is assumed 
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that fuzziness is present in sample information, 
along the lines of [9], [18], and [25]. 
Results in Section 5 suggest a more exhaus­
tive analysis of the worth of sample informa­
tion in decision-making problems with fuzzy util­
ities. Thus, it would be interesting to analyze 
the extended Expected Value of Sample infor­
mation in those problems, and to employ this 
fuzzy value to compare experiments and select 
one which provides the decision maker with the 
highest extended EVSI. Comparison of experi­
ments is a well established statistical theory de­
veloped by Blackwell. He introduced a crite­
rion, [3], based on statistical sufficiency, in which 
the purpose is to get sample information contain­
ing as much probabilistic information as possible 
regarding the state (without making reference to 
a decision-making context). It is a usual prac­
tice in this type of study to check the suitability 
of new criteria by examining their implications 
with Blackwell's. Thus, it would be also use­
ful to analyze the connections of Blackwell's suf­
ficiency criterion with the criterion to compare 
experiments based on the extended EV Sl. 
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